04-mitre-mapping

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping – Latency-Driven Techniques

Below is a direct mapping between NAC latency conditions and MITRE ATT&CK techniques that are frequently enabled or amplified by delayed enforcement.

This mapping highlights that latency does not create new attack techniques — it enables well-known ones.


1. Initial Access

1.1 T1078 – Valid Accounts

How latency enables it:

  • Reliance on exceptions and generic authorization profiles

  • Trust granted before full validation completes

  • Identity assumed based on partial signals

Impact: Attackers obtain access using legitimate-looking identities created by NAC exceptions.


1.2 T1133 – External Remote Services

How latency enables it:

  • NAC does not block tunnels or remote sessions fast enough

  • Initial outbound connections succeed before enforcement

Impact: Remote access channels are established during pre-enforcement windows.


2. Defense Evasion

2.1 T1562 – Impair Defenses

How latency enables it:

  • Exploitation of fail-open behavior

  • Abuse of degraded modes under control-plane stress

Impact: Security controls are bypassed without being disabled — simply outpaced.


2.2 T1036 – Masquerading

How latency enables it:

  • Device profiling is slow or incomplete

  • Trust is granted before classification converges

Impact: Attackers impersonate printers, cameras, or IoT devices and inherit overly permissive policies.


3. Discovery

3.1 T1046 – Network Service Scanning

How latency enables it:

  • Scanning executed during pre-policy windows

  • Generic ACLs allow limited but sufficient reachability

Impact: Attackers enumerate internal services before segmentation is enforced.


4. Lateral Movement

4.1 T1021 – Remote Services

How latency enables it:

  • Segmentation applied after initial connectivity

  • Temporary reachability across trust boundaries

Impact: Lateral movement occurs before NAC convergence.


5. Command and Control

5.1 T1071 – Application Layer Protocol

How latency enables it:

  • DNS and HTTPS allowed in pre-auth

  • NAC enforces identity, not content

Impact: C2 channels are established and cached before blocking occurs.


6. Key Insight from the Mapping

This mapping makes one thing clear:

Latency is not neutral — it actively enables known adversary techniques.

NAC does not fail because attackers are sophisticated. It fails because time favors the attacker.


7. Closing Thoughts — NAC That Is Slow Is NAC That Fails

The most dangerous mistake is not deploying NAC imperfectly. It is believing that latency is only a performance problem.

When authentication is delayed:

  • Policy arrives late

  • Segmentation fails

  • The attacker is already inside

Effective NAC is not only about:

  • Identity

  • Posture

  • Integration

It is about time.


From Mapping to Disruption: Using NAC to Break the Kill Chain

Mapping NAC latency to MITRE ATT&CK is only useful if it drives design and validation. This section translates the mapping into concrete defensive objectives.

The goal is not to “cover” ATT&CK techniques — it is to deny attackers the time required to execute them.


8. Defensive Objective by Kill Chain Phase

8.1 Reconnaissance — Deny Feedback

Objective: Prevent NAC from acting as a timing or behavior oracle.

Design requirements:

  • Deterministic port behavior

  • No observable difference between:

    • Failed auth

    • Pending auth

    • Partial auth

  • Minimal and identical pre-auth behavior across ports

If attackers can infer policy from timing, NAC is leaking intelligence.


8.2 Initial Access — Collapse the Pre-Enforcement Window

Objective: Make pre-auth non-operational.

Design requirements:

  • No meaningful data-plane access before enforcement

  • DNS restricted to:

    • Explicit infrastructure endpoints

    • Rate-limited and logged

  • No temporary VLANs with business reachability

Success criteria:

There is nothing useful to exploit before policy convergence.


8.3 Privilege Escalation — Enforce Continuous Validation

Objective: Prevent identity from becoming sticky.

Design requirements:

  • Mandatory reassessment

  • Identity bound to:

    • Session

    • Location

    • Device state

  • Authorization invalidated on:

    • IP change

    • VLAN change

    • Profiling drift

Identity must decay unless continuously reaffirmed.


8.4 Lateral Movement — Enforce Segmentation Before Connectivity

Objective: Ensure segmentation exists at first packet, not eventually.

Design requirements:

  • dACL / SGT applied at authorization, not post-auth

  • No generic ACLs that span trust zones

  • No cross-domain reachability during authentication

Segmentation applied late is segmentation that failed.


8.5 Command and Control — Treat DNS as a Control Plane

Objective: Prevent early establishment of C2.

Design requirements:

  • DNS treated as high-risk, not benign

  • Pre-auth DNS restricted to:

    • Explicit allowlists

    • Known resolvers

  • No recursive external resolution before enforcement

DNS-first trust is C2-first trust.


8.6 Actions on Objectives — Eliminate Persistence via NAC

Objective: Ensure NAC cannot be used as a persistence mechanism.

Design requirements:

  • No permanent exceptions

  • All bypasses:

    • Time-bound

    • Owner-bound

    • Audited

  • Profiling trust must decay over time

Persistence through NAC is a design failure, not a configuration error.


9. Validation: Proving NAC Disrupts ATT&CK

9.1 Purple Team Test Scenarios

For each environment, regularly test:

  • Traffic sent immediately after link-up

  • DNS resolution before authorization

  • Lateral probes during pre-auth

  • Reauth-triggered race conditions

  • Exception reuse after reassessment

Expected result:

All attempts fail before meaningful access is achieved.


9.2 Metrics That Matter (ATT&CK-Oriented)

Track continuously:

  • Time-to-effective-policy (TTEP)

  • Time spent in pre-auth

  • Sessions with partial enforcement

  • Sessions authorized via exception

  • Reauth frequency vs enforcement stability

If you cannot measure disruption, you are only assuming it.


10. Architectural Reality Check

NAC is often deployed to:

  • Satisfy compliance

  • Improve visibility

  • Enforce identity

But its security value depends on one factor:

Does enforcement arrive before the attacker advances?

If the answer is uncertain, NAC is a detective control at best.


Final Synthesis (Latency + ATT&CK)

Latency does not create new attacks. It enables known ones by providing:

  • Time

  • Feedback

  • Predictability

NAC that is not time-aware does not break the kill chain — it merely documents its progression.


Final Rule (ATT&CK Disruption)

If your NAC cannot reliably deny ATT&CK techniques before enforcement converges, it is observing the attack — not stopping it.


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